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Purpose. Distinguishing accurate from inaccurate identifications is a challenging issue in
the criminal justice system, especially for biased police line-ups. That is because biased
line-ups undermine the diagnostic value of accuracy post-dictors such as confidence and
decision time. Here, we aimed to test general and eyewitness-specific self-ratings of
memory capacity as potential estimators of identification performance that are unaffected
by line-up bias.
Methods. Participants (N = 744) completed a metamemory assessment consisting of
the Multifactorial Metamemory Questionnaire and the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale
and took part in a standard eyewitness paradigm. Following the presentation of a mock-
crime video, they viewed either biased or unbiased line-ups.
Results. Self-ratings of discontentment with eyewitness memory ability were indicative
of identification accuracy for both biased and unbiased line-ups. Participants who scored
low on eyewitness metamemory factors also displayed a stronger confidence–accuracy
calibration than those who scored high.
Conclusions. These results suggest a promising role for self-ratings ofmemory capacity
in the evaluation of eyewitness identifications, while also advancing theory on self-
assessments for different memory systems.
Eyewitnesses play a major role in the criminal justice system, especially in cases lacking
other physical evidence. Inmany jurisdictions, suspects aremore likely to beprosecuted if
an eyewitness identifies them as the perpetrator of a crime. However, as with other types
of evidence, eyewitness identifications can be in error or contaminated (Wixted, Mickes,
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& Fisher, 2018). Researchers have identified some factors that can be used to distinguish
accurate from inaccurate witnesses, including early statements of confidence (Brewer &
Wells, 2006; Wixted & Wells, 2017), decision time during the identification (Sauer,
Brewer, & Wells, 2008; Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Sporer, 1993), and self-reported
decision process (Dunning&Stern, 1994; Smith, Lindsay, &Pryke, 2001).However,when
eyewitnesses are exposed to biased line-ups, the value of post-dictors such as confidence
and decision time is undermined (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011; Key et al., 2017).
We testedwhether general and eyewitness-specific self-ratings ofmemory efficacy can
be used to discriminate identification performance, based on theoretical frameworks of
metamemory. In particular, we aimed to investigate the efficacy ofmetamemory factors as
post-dictors of eyewitness identification for biased and unbiased line-ups. Metamemory
refers to the knowledge and awareness that an individual has about their own memory
capabilities (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). This introspective knowledge is often used to
monitor and control one’s own memory performance. Research on metacognitive
judgements has expanded rapidly, focusing on how well people think they have learned
new information (i.e., judgements of learning; Double, Birney, &Walker, 2018) and how
well people feel they recognize a particular piece of information (i.e., feeling of knowing;
Koriat, 2000).
One predominant view is that metacognitive judgements are inferential in nature,
involving a variety of heuristics and cues that have some degree of validity in predicting
objective memory performance (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). Such cues can be
divided into experience-based (the subjective learning experience) or information-based
(people’s beliefs about their own memory capacities and limitations; Koriat, Nussinson,
Bless, & Shaked, 2008). For example, metamemory judgements can be influenced by how
quickly or easily an item is processed or accessed (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2017) and by
preconceived notions about one’s own competence in the domain tested (Dunning,
Johnson, Ehrlinger, &Kruger, 2003). Understandingmetamemory judgements in forensic
settings is important because eyewitnesses may produce confidence statements or
identification decisions that are partially based on intrinsic cues of self-efficacy (Leippe &
Eisenstadt, 2014). That is, confidence judgements produced by eyewitnesses in forensic
relevant tasks (e.g., line-up identifications) may not depend only on memory trace
strength, but also on other intrinsic cues related to self-perceived memory efficacy
(Brewer & Sampaio, 2012).
Brewer and Sampaio (2012) argue that confidence judgements result from the
integration of two key components: information related to products and processes of the
memory, and the individual’s metamemory beliefs. In this prediction, confidence
judgements are based partly on the learning experience, and partly on domain-specific
beliefs (e.g., ‘My memory is not so good’; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Studies investigating
the role of domain-specific beliefs in eyewitness confidence reports are sparse.Olsson and
Juslin (1999), for example, found that individuals who considered themselves to be good
face recognizers were more accurate and had a stronger confidence–accuracy relation in
line-up identifications. Similarly, Perfect (2004) found that self-rated efficacy in the
domain of eyewitness memory (i.e., face recognition and episodic details) was predictive
of confidence judgements in a cued-recall task. These initial findings suggest that
expressions of confidence in eyewitness settings may be influenced by witnesses’ beliefs
about their own memory efficacy.
A complementary branch of metamemory research has focused on elucidating the
relation between self-rated memory efficacy and objective memory performance. Some
longitudinal studies have shown a positive relation between MSE and memory
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performance in different tasks (Seeman, McAvay, Merrill, Albert, & Rodin, 1996; Valentijn
et al., 2006). Regarding face recognition ability, different tests of subjective and objective
performance have been proposed as post-dictors of identification accuracy and proclivity
to choose (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012/2016; Grabman, Dobolyi,
Berelovich, & Dodson, 2019; Russ et al., 2018). For example, Grabman et al. (2019)
found that individuals with stronger objective face recognition ability have a stronger
eyewitness confidence–accuracy relationship. In the face matching literature, moderate-
to-large correlations between self-reported face perception ability and performance in
objective face matching tests have been documented (Gray, Bird, & Cook, 2017; Shah,
Sowden, Gaule, Catmur, & Bird, 2015; Ventura, Livingston, & Shah, 2018). However,
studies focusing specifically on face recognition tasks have shown that individuals have
limited insight into their ability to recognize unfamiliar faces (Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock,
2018). It has been argued that individuals tend to overgeneralize their ability to recognize
familiar faces to situations in which unfamiliar faces need to be identified (Bindemann
et al., 2014). Therefore, it might be expected that the association between self-ratings of
memory efficacy and objective memory functioning should be strongest when the self-
rated efficacy is specific to the targeted memory task.
Contemporarymemorymodels propose thatmemory consists of relatively independent
systems (Baddeley, 2000; Tulving, 2007). Different memory systems can share some basic
features (e.g., the means of acquiring new information), but they differ in some other
features (e.g., functions, operatingprinciples, andunderlyingneuralmechanisms; Schacter,
Wagner, & Buckner, 2000; Tulving, 2007). Thus, it can be expected that perceived lack of
ability in one domain (e.g., semantic memory) may not be predictive of perceived failure in
an eyewitness-relevant domain (e.g., memory of faces or episodic memory). In a meta-
analysis of 107 studies, Beaudoin andDesrichard (2011) found that the association between
memory self-efficacy and performance was stronger for perceived efficacy for a specific
memory task compared to perceived global memory efficacy. That is, individuals’
assessments of their likely performance on a specific memory task were more closely
related tomemory accuracy than their self-ratings about their owngeneralmemory efficacy.
Beaudoin and Desrichard (2011) argue that concurrent memory self-efficacy is more likely
to be related tomemory performance than globalmemory self-efficacy because individual’s
global memory results from the aggregation of individual’s appraisals of their performance
across distinct domains. Importantly, the same meta-analysis did not find evidence that
domain memory self-efficacy is more strongly related to memory performance than global
memory self-efficacy. However, this result was obtained in analyses with low statistical
power due to the small number of effect sizes associated with specific assessments of
domain memory self-efficacy (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011). Therefore, it is still unclear
whether the relation between memory performance and memory self-efficacy is stronger
for domain memory self-efficacy or global memory self-efficacy.
One challenge in investigating domainmemory self-efficacy is that psychometric tools
assessing global memory self-efficacy are more prevalent than tools assessing domain
memory self-efficacy. Global memory self-efficacy is typically assessed using scales that
include a variety of items related to many different memory domains and tasks (e.g.,
remembering important dates, remembering names, remembering facts). The Multifac-
torial Metamemory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002) is one example of
instrument used to assess self-perceived performance and functioning of global memory.
An instrument assessing memory self-efficacy for a specific domain that is more relevant
for the current research is the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, which measures self-rated
efficacy and endorsement of strategies for face and person recognition (Saraiva, van
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Boeijen, Hope, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 2019; Saraiva et al., 2019). In the current
study, we tested self-ratings of general memory efficacy (MMQ) and self-ratings of
eyewitness memory efficacy (EMS) as predictors of line-up identification performance.
We also aimed to test identification performance for both biased and unbiased line-ups,
given that other predictors of identification accuracy (e.g., confidence and decision time)
are dependent on line-up bias (Charman et al., 2011; Key et al., 2017).
A line-up can be considered biasedwhen the suspect differs noticeably fromother line-
upmembers so that the suspect ‘stands out’ among the line-upoptions (Wells et al., 1998).
In such instance, the line-up fillers are implausible and do not serve as functional
alternatives to the suspect (Tredoux, 1999). One important issue with biased line-ups is
that they undermine the effectiveness of post-dictors of accuracy such as identification
confidence and decision time (Charman et al., 2011; Key et al., 2017). That is because
subjective likelihood judgments are often based on comparisons between the chosen
option and each of the individual alternatives. If implausible alternatives are present, there
is increased perceived support for the chosen option, consequently inflating confidence
judgements (Windschitl & Chambers, 2004). Charman et al. (2011) found that the
presence of highly dissimilar fillers inflates witnesses’ confidence in mistaken identifi-
cations. Similarly, Key et al. (2017) suggested that when the suspect stands out, witnesses
tend to be overconfident and faster (regardless of accuracy) compared to witnesses
exposed to unbiased line-ups. Taken together, these findings suggest that confidence and
decision time, normally effective post-dictors of identification accuracy, have little
diagnostic value if the identification decision was made from a biased line-up.
Our predictions about the relationship between line-up fairness and self-assessments
of memory efficacy draw from the literature on metamemory and task difficulty. In
unbiased line-ups, eyewitnesses need to rely more on their memory trace of the
perpetrator to recognize one of the line-up members as a match of the remembered
suspect’s appearance. In contrast, biased line-ups may be perceived as easier because
fillers are less similar to the suspect and therefore are implausible options. This perceived
lower difficulty in biased line-ups creates a potentially misleading heuristic for
metamemory judgements based on perceptual fluency. It has long been known that
manipulations of perceptual fluency during retrieval can produce memory illusions
(Jacoby &Whitehouse, 1989). One example is the belief that a more easily perceived test
item is likely to be an old item. As such, memory misattribution may occur if perceptual
ease ismistakenly assumed to indicate the stimulus’s prior presentation (Higham&Vokey,
2000). In fact, under conditions of perceptual ease, metacognitive calibration tends to be
weak, erring on the side of overconfidence (Chandler, 1994). Therefore, it might be
expected that – if self-ratings ofmemory efficacy are related to identification performance
– this relation will be weaker for biased compared to unbiased line-ups. However, it is
important to acknowledge that this specific prediction is limited because perceptual
fluency occurs at time of test and may be only loosely related to self-ratings of
metamemory ability. Nevertheless, in order to examine this research question, we
hypothesize that the relationship between metamemory factors and eyewitness identi-
fication performance to be weaker for biased than unbiased line-ups.
The current study
The purpose of this study was to test general and eyewitness-specific self-ratings of
memory efficacy as predictors of eyewitness identification performance, for both biased
and unbiased line-ups. We hypothesized self-ratings of memory efficacy to be related to
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eyewitness identification accuracy (H1) and that this relationship would be stronger for
self-efficacy in eyewitness-specific memory domains compared to self-efficacy in general
memory domains (H2). Furthermore, we predicted individuals with higher self-ratings in
the metamemory factors would display a stronger confidence–accuracy calibration than
individuals with lower ratings (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; H3). Finally, we expected the
relation between metamemory factors and eyewitness identification performance to be
weaker for biased than unbiased line-ups (H4).
Method
The data, analysis code, and preregistration of this study can be found on the following
Open Science Framework repository: https://osf.io/ymkz9/?view_only=49c11c
762050470fbe45880af51512ee
Participants
A total of 1,103participants completed the study1.We applied several exclusion criteria to
ensure data quality: (1) 34 cases were removed for taking more than 90 min to complete
the experiment, and (2) 97 cases for completing the experiment in under 15 min; (3) 95
cases were removed for not passing at least four out of five attention checks; and (4) 44
caseswere removed due to suspicious bot activity (Prims&Motyl, 2018). The final sample
(N = 744) had a mean age of M = 29.98, ranging from 18 to 72 years (SD = 12.63), and
was comprised of 63% female participants (four participants chose not to disclose
gender). Most participants were workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (54%), followed
by university students (34%) and participants found through social media (12%).
Participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk received US$1.00, students received
course credits, and participants from social media were entered into a prize drawing for
two £50 Amazon vouchers.
Our sample size was determined based on the confidence–accuracy calibration
analysis, given that it is the most demanding analysis in our design. There are no clear
guidelines on sample size requirements for calibration analysis, so we evaluated previous
studies and reasoned that 400 choosers would provide stable estimates for calibration
curves with five confidence levels (Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Sauerland &
Sporer, 2009). Each participant completed two identifications, so our total amount of
observations was 1,488, of which 815 were choosers. The final number of choosers
surpassed our initial target of 400 choosers because we permitted data collection to
continue during a period of optimal recruitment. There were no concerns of overpow-
ering the experiment as our target sample size was based on achieving stability for the
calibration analysis, in which case more data provide better stability.
Materials and instruments
Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS)
The EMS contains 23 items divided into three factors: Contentment, Discontentment, and
Strategies (Saraiva, van Boeijen, et al., 2019; Saraiva et al., 2019). All items are rated on a
1 Part of the data used in this study was also used in a separate study focused on the development and validation of the Eyewitness
Metamemory Scale.
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scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The EMS-Contentment
factor comprises 10 items (e.g., ‘My ability to remember faces is much better than other
people’s ability to remember faces’; a = .85)with higher scores indicating higher levels of
memory contentment with respect to the ability to remember or recognize faces. The
EMS-Discontentment factor has eight items (e.g., ‘Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a
person that I know relatively well’; a = .89) with higher scores indicating higher memory
discontentment with ability to remember or recognize faces. The EMS-Strategies factor
comprises five items (e.g., ‘I often create a visual image in mymind of a face that I want to
remember’; a = .81) with higher scores indicating higher endorsement of memory
strategies to remember faces. Importantly, the items comprising the EMS-Strategies factor
do not necessarily depict efficient or inefficient memory strategies, so higher scorers on
this factor indicate endorsement of a greater number of different strategies, rather than the
use of more efficient strategies.
General metamemory instruments
In addition to the EMS, participants also completed the Multifactorial Memory Question-
naire (Troyer & Rich, 2002), and the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (Bergen,
Brands, & Jelicic, 2010; Squire,Wetzel, & Slater, 1979). TheMMQconsists of three factors:
Contentment (a = .92), Ability (a = .92), and Strategy (a = .88). The contentment factor
has 18 items (e.g., ‘I am generally pleasedwithmymemory ability’) rated from 1 (strongly
agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), with higher scores indicating higher memory content-
ment. The ability factor has 20 items related to experiences with commonmemory errors
over the past 2 weeks (e.g., ‘How often do you forget an appointment?’) from 1 (all the
time) to 5 (never), with higher scores indicating better self-reported ability. The strategy
factor has 19 items concerning the use ofmemory strategies during the past 2 weeks (e.g.,
‘How often do you use a timer or alarm to remind youwhen to do something?’). The items
are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time), with higher scores
indicating greater use of memory strategies. The SSMQ consists of 18 items related to the
development ofmemory functioning (e.g., ‘My ability to recall things when I really try is’),
rated on a 9-point scale ranging from4 (worse than ever) to 4 (better than ever before).
Stimulus event
Participants viewed a 75-s film depicting a thief stealing a phone from a victim (adapted
from Sauerland et al., 2009, Experiment 4). There were two versions of the video
counterbalancing the role of two actresses (victim and perpetrator) to better generalize
the results to different suspects. Thus, in one version actress Awas the perpetrator, while
in the other version actress B was the perpetrator.
Line-ups
Every participant received two line-ups, one for the perpetrator and one for the victim in
the stimulus event. All line-ups were presented in a simultaneous format and could be
either target-present or target-absent. Target-present line-ups consisted of five fillers and
the target (i.e., victim or perpetrator) and target-absent line-ups consisted of six fillers.
Target presence and the position of each member in the line-up were randomized for
every line-uppresentation. Pilot testswere conducted to construct fair andunfair line-ups.
In those tests, participants read a description of the target and were asked to select the
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personwhobestmatched this description from a line-up of sixmembers. Tredoux’s Ewas
used as ameasure of line-up fairness (Tredoux, 1998). Tredoux’s E takes aminimum value
of 1 and a maximum value that equals the nominal line-up size (six in this case). If some
line-up members are selected less often than expected by chance, E values decrease
towards 1 depending on the number of line-up members falling below chance levels of
choosing. Four pilot tests were conducted with a total of 123 participants, adapting the
line-ups to create sufficiently fair and unfair line-ups. The final four fair line-ups (i.e., target
present and target absent for each of the two targets) had Tredoux’ E values ranging from
3.81 and 4.57, while the four unfair line-ups had Tredoux’ E values ranging from 1.54 to
2.56.
Procedure
Participants were recruited to an online experiment presented via Qualtrics. First,
participants completed the EMS, followed by the MMQ and SSMQ. The EMS was always
shown first, while theMMQ and SSMQwere presented in randomorder. Participants then
watched the mock-crime film, followed by a 5-min filler task. Next, the first line-up was
presented and participants were asked to identify the target or choose a ‘not-present’
option, while also providing a confidence judgement on a scale that ranged from 0% (not
confident at all) to 100% (totally confident). After a 5-min filler task, participants received
the second line-up. The order of line-up presentation was randomized for every
participant (i.e., either perpetrator first or victim first). Finally, some demographic
information including gender, age, and educational level was requested.
Results
In our analyses, we tested choosers and non-choosers separately for two reasons. First, it
has been documented that post-dictors of identification performance have different
associations for choosers versus non-choosers (e.g., Sauerland & Sporer, 2007, 2019;
Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Second, triers of fact are more specifically
concerned with eyewitnesses who choose someone from a line-up, rather than
eyewitnesses who reject a line-up (Mickes, 2015). Before conducting our main analyses,
we examined whether line-up performance was significantly affected by the role of line-
up targets (i.e., perpetrator vs. victim line-ups). Logistic regression models showed that
identification accuracy did not vary as a function of line-up target role for choosers
(p = .13) or non-choosers (p = .86; see Table 1), so the data from both perpetrator and
victim line-ups were aggregated for the following analyses. Tables 2 and 3 present the
main descriptive statistics of the line-up identification data.
Metamemory as predictors of eyewitness identification accuracy
First, we focused on the relation between metamemory and eyewitness identification
accuracy by fitting regression models with metamemory factors as predictors of
eyewitness identification accuracy for choosers and non-choosers. The metamemory
factors included as predictors in the regression models were as follows: EMS-Content-
ment, EMS-Discontentment, EMS-Strategies, MMQ-Contentment, MMQ-Ability, MMQ-
Strategy, and SSMQ-Memory Development. For choosers, correct identifications were
coded as 1 and incorrect identifications (filler or innocent-suspect identifications) were
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coded as 0. For non-choosers, correct rejections were coded as 1 and incorrect rejections
were coded as 0.
Each participantmade two line-up decisions. Thus, the data were nested in two levels,
with identification trials at Level 1 and participants at Level 2. Accordingly, we first tested
for the necessity of using mixed-effects models in order to account for the nested
components of the data (Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017). Mixed-effect models
allow for the simultaneous examination of the effects of individual-level and group-level
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of line-up performance per line-up target role (i.e., perpetrator vs. victim)
All line-up
identifications
(N = 1488)
Perpetrator
line-up
(N = 744)
Victim line-up
(N = 744)
n % n % n %
Choosers
Correct identifications 461 31.0 251 33.7 210 28.22
Filler identifications 354 23.7 174 23.3 180 24.2
Non-choosers
Correct rejections 481 32.3 227 30.5 254 34.1
Incorrect rejections 192 12.9 92 12.3 100 13.4
Target-present Line-ups
Guilty-suspect identifications 461 31.0 251 33.7 210 28.2
Filler identifications 98 6.58 44 5.91 54 7.25
Line-up rejections 192 12.9 92 12.3 100 13.4
Target-absent line-ups
Innocent-suspect identifications 86 5.77 45 6.04 41 5.51
Filler identifications 170 11.4 85 11.4 85 11.4
Line-up rejections 481 32.3 227 30.5 254 34.1
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of line-up performance per line-up bias condition
Biased (N = 750) Unbiased (N = 738)
n % n %
Choosers (N = 815)
Correct identifications 266 35.5 195 26.4
Filler identifications 148 19.7 206 27.9
Non-choosers (N = 673)
Correct rejections 237 31.6 244 33.1
Incorrect rejections 99 13.2 93 12.6
Target-present line-ups (N = 751)
Guilty-suspect identifications 266 66.3 195 55.7
Filler identifications 36 9.0 62 17.7
Line-up rejections 99 24.7 93 26.6
Target-absent line-ups (N = 737)
Innocent-suspect identifications 56 16.0 30 7.7
Filler identifications 56 16.0 114 29.4
Line-up rejections 237 67.9 244 62.9
d’ d’
1.41 1.60
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variables on outcomes. That is, the variables composing a mixed-effect model are
conceptualized in a hierarchical manner, so that observations can be nested within
individuals, individuals can be nested within groups, groups can be nested within
communities, and so on. Mixed-effect models are recommended when examining nested
data because suchmodels account for the fact that individual observations are, in general,
not completely independent, while standard regression models assume observations are
independent. In our data, it might be expected that the outcomes observed in the line-up
identifications are not independent because each participant completed two identifica-
tion trials. Intra-class correlation coefficients (i.e., the average correlation measured
between observations in the same level) were examined to assess the necessity of using
mixed-effect models in our data. We also compared models accounting for nesting in the
data (i.e., random-intercept models) with models that did not account for nesting (i.e.,
fixed-interceptmodels) in order to determinewhethermixed-effectmodels had abetter fit
to the data.
The R package lme4 was used for all multilevel modelling (Bates, M€achler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2014). Global models were fitted including all metamemory factors as predictors
of each outcome variable (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). All predictors were centred
around their grandmean, subtracting the overall mean of that variable from each subject’s
score. Across the different models, we found that the intra-class correlation coefficients
for participants ranged from .00 to .11 and ICC for line-ups were all .00. We further
conducted likelihood ratio tests comparing random-intercept models and fixed-intercept
models for each outcomevariable and foundno evidence that random-interceptmodels fit
the data significantly better than the fixed-intercept models for all outcomes (see
Table S1). Taken together, these results do not support the use of random coefficient
modelling (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). Therefore, we proceeded with estimating
logistic regression models with no random effects. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics
and correlation among all metamemory scales. Correlations ranged from r = .55 to
r = .61. Two out of six diagnostic tests pointed to the presence of multicollinearity in the
model, but inspection of variance inflation factor, tolerance, Farrar-Glauber F-tests, and
partial correlations revealed negligible multicollinearity, so we proceeded without
adopting remedial measures. The Benjamini-Hochberg correction was applied to all p-
values from the regressionmodels to account formultiple testing and false discovery rates
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Odds ratio (OR) was examined as a measure of effect size
in the logistic regression models.
We hypothesized that self-ratings of memory efficacy would be related to eyewitness
identification accuracy (H1) and that this relationship would be stronger for self-efficacy
in eyewitness-specific memory domains compared to self-efficacy in general memory
domains (H2). Our first set of model testing focused on choosers, fitting one model for
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of line-up performance per level of identification confidence
Line-up confidence level
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Correct identifications 1 5 6 26 23 44 51 83 74 73 75
Filler identifications 3 10 14 29 39 59 77 54 37 24 8
Correct rejections 5 2 8 11 25 40 52 74 86 83 95
Incorrect rejections 6 3 3 10 12 18 25 33 36 21 25
Total choices 15 20 31 76 99 161 205 244 233 201 203
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biased line-ups and another model for unbiased line-ups (see Table 5). Among choosers,
higher scores in EMS-Discontentment (i.e., memory discontentment with ability to
remember or recognize faces) were indicative of lower accuracy for both biased
(OR = 0.57, p < .001) and unbiased line-ups (OR = 0.56, p < .001; see Figure 1). None of
the othermetamemory factorswere significant predictors of choosers accuracy for biased
and unbiased line-ups. We then repeated the same steps for the non-choosers subset,
fitting logistic regression models using metamemory factors as predictors of accuracy for
biased and unbiased line-ups (see Table 6). The results showed that none of the
metamemory factors were significant predictors of non-choosers identification accuracy
for both biased and unbiased line-ups.
In addition to the initial regression models, we conducted exploratory analyses with
regression models including identification confidence as an additional estimator of
identification accuracy. In thosemodels, themetamemorymeasures and confidencewere
included as predictors of identification accuracy for choosers in biased and unbiased line-
ups. The aim of this analysis was to further examine whether the predictive value of the
metamemory measures (i.e., information-based judgements) when accounting for the
variance explained by identification confidence (i.e., experience-based judgements). The
results showed that confidencewas a significant predictor of accuracy for both biased and
unbiased line-ups (see Table 7). Similar to what was observed in the previous model, EMS-
Discontentment was a significant predictor of identification accuracy for both biased and
unbiased line-ups, with higher scores of EMS-Discontentment being indicative of less
accuracy identifications. Surprisingly, EMS-Contentment was also a significant predictor
of identification accuracy for unbiased line-ups, with higher scores of EMS-Contentment
being indicative of less accurate identifications.
Metamemory and confidence–accuracy calibration
Calibration analyses were carried out to examine the relation between metamemory
measures and the confidence–accuracy relationship in identification tasks. Following
Brewer and Wells (2006), calibration curves were created by plotting the proportion of
correct responses against fivecategories of confidence (0–20%,30–40%,50–60%, 70–80%,
and 90–100%). We first produced calibration curves for choosers versus non-choosers,
and biased line-ups versus unbiased line-ups (see Figure 2). The diagonal line represents
perfect calibration, such that each level of confidence is equivalent to the level of accuracy
for decisions made with that level of confidence. Observations above this line indicate
Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the metamemory factors
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. EMS-contentment 4.20 1.02
2. EMS-discontentment 3.53 1.09 -.32**
3. EMS-strategy 4.50 1.09 .41** .05
4. MMQ-contentment 3.62 0.70 .30** -.55** .07**
5. MMQ-ability 3.57 0.63 .31** -.38** .17** .55**
6. MMQ-strategy 2.86 0.64 .08** .24** .19** -.31** -.44**
7. SSMQ 5.89 1.21 .61** -.22** .35** .47** .41** .05*
Note. EMS = Eyewitness Metamemory Scale, M = Mean, MMQ = Multifactorial Metamemory Ques-
tionnaire, SD = Standard deviation, SSMQ = Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; *** indicates p < .001
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underconfidence, and observations below this line indicate overconfidence. We
computed three calibration statistics: calibration index, over/underconfidence, and
resolution (see Brewer & Wells, 2006). Calibration (C) represents how far a given
calibration curve is from a perfect calibration. It ranges from 0 (perfect calibration) to 1,
and lower values represent better calibration. Over/underconfidence (O/U) indicate if a
curve straysmore above or below theperfect calibration line,with values ranging from1
(very underconfident) to 1 (very overconfident). The Normalized Resolution Index (NRI)
represents how well confidence discriminates accurate from inaccurate identifications,
ranging from 0 = no discrimination to 1 = perfect discrimination.NRI is equivalent to g2
in a one-way analysis of variance and can be interpreted as the percentage of variance of
the outcome variable accounted for by confidence judgements, so NRI values of 0.01,
0.06, and 0.14 can be interpreted as small,medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen,
1988;Yaniv, Yates,&Smith, 1991). FollowingPalmer, Brewer,Weber, andNagesh (2013),
we used a jackknife procedure to compute standard errors for each calibration statistic,
which were then converted to 95% inferential confidence intervals (Tryon, 2001). If the
confidence intervals do not overlap, that represents a significant difference. For choosers,
the resolution statistic showed a high capability to discriminate between accurate and
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of identification accuracy among choosers as a function of EMS-
Discontentment for biased and unbiased line-ups. The shaded polygon represents 95% confidence
intervals.
Table 6. Logistic regression models of metamemory factors as predictors of identification accuracy
among non-choosers
Predictor
Biased line-ups Unbiased line-ups
B (SE) p OR [95% CI] B (SE) p OR [95% CI]
EMS-contentment 0.23 (.18) .51 0.79 [0.55, 1.13] 0.21 (.17) .52 0.81 [0.57, 1.14]
EMS-discontentment 0.26 (.16) .43 0.77 [0.56, 1.05] 0.31 (.16) .36 0.73 [0.53, 1.01]
EMS-strategies 0.06 (.14) .75 1.06 [0.80, 1.41] 0.09 (.13) .73 1.10 [0.84, 1.43]
MMQ-contentment 0.36 (.16) .20 1.43 [1.03, 1.99] 0.20 (.19) .56 0.81 [0.55, 1.19]
MMQ-ability 0.12 (.15) .70 0.88 [0.65, 1.20] 0.09 (.17) .73 1.09 [0.77, 1.54]
MMQ-strategy 0.05 (.14) .75 1.06 [0.79, 1.41] 0.13 (.16) .67 1.14 [0.84, 1.56]
SSMQ 0.09 (.17) .73 0.91 [0.64, 1.28] 0.11 (.18) .73 1.11 [0.78, 1.59]
Note. All p-values in the regressionmodels were adjusted using Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate.
OR = Odds ratio. EMS = Eyewitness Metamemory Scale. MMQ = Multifactorial Metamemory Ques-
tionnaire. SSMQ = Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire.
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inaccurate identification decisions, for both biased (NRI = 0.12) and unbiased line-ups
(NRI = 0.11; see Table 8). However, choosers tended to be more overconfident in
unbiased line-ups (O/U = 0.14) compared to biased line-ups (O/U = 0.03).
Next, we compared calibration statistics between high and low scorers on each of the
metamemory measures. Following Olsson and Juslin (1999), individuals above the 66th
percentile were selected as high scorers and individuals below the 33th percentile as low
scorers. For this analysis, we focus on choosers, because triers of fact aremore specifically
concerned with eyewitnesses that choose someone from a line-up, rather than
eyewitnesses that reject a line-up (Mickes, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Each
metamemory group (low scorers and high scorers) had a mean sample size of n = 271.
Inspection of the confidence intervals suggested that low scorers in the EMS-Content-
ment, EMS-Discontentment, EMS-Strategies, and SSMQ were significantly less overcon-
fident than higher scorers in those components (see Figure 3). The calibration curves for
those measures reveal that lower scorers were generally better calibrated than high
scorers, especially for higher levels of confidence (see Figure 4). A similar pattern of
results was observed for both biased and unbiased line-ups (see supplemental materials).
Discussion
We investigated the diagnostic value of self-ratings of memory efficacy on eyewitness
identification accuracy and confidence, examining the relationship betweenmemory self-
Figure 2. Confidence–accuracy calibration curves comparing choosers and non-choosers (a) and biased
versus unbiased line-ups (b). The dotted diagonal grey line represents perfect calibration. The points on
the curves are positioned in the mean confidence of the respective confidence group.
Table 8. Calibration statistics for choosers and non-choosers across biased and unbiased conditions
C [95% CI] O/U [95% CI] NRI [95% CI]
Biased line-ups
Choosers 0.01 [0.01, 0.02] 0.03 [0.01 0.07] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18]
Non-choosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] 0.04 [0.01, 0.09] 0.02 [0.01, 0.04]
Unbiased line-ups
Choosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] 0.14 [0.09, 0.18] 0.11 [0.05, 0.17]
Non-choosers 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] 0.03 [0.08, 0.01] 0.04 [0.01, 0.09]
Note. C = Calibration index, NRI = Normalized resolution index, O/U = Over/underconfidence
index.
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efficacy and identification performance for both biased and unbiased line-ups. Our results
revealed two key findings. First, higher discontentment with face recognition and person
identification efficacy (EMS-Discontentment) was indicative of more inaccurate identi-
fications for choosers in both biased and unbiased line-ups. Second, low scorers in EMS-
Contentment, EMS-Discontentment, EMS-Strategies, and SSMQ were less overconfident
and were generally better calibrated than high scorers, especially for higher levels of
Figure 3. Inferential confidence intervals of calibration statistics for high and low scorers in each
metamemory measure for all line-ups.
Figure 4. Calibration curves (all line-ups) comparing low and high scorers in the EMS-Contentment,
EMS-Discontentment, EMS-Strategy and SSMQ metamemory factors. The points on the curves are
positioned in the mean confidence of the respective confidence group.
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confidence. These findings contribute to an ongoing debate concerning the relationship
between behavioural and self-reported face recognition efficacy. While some research
suggests that individuals have only limited insight into their own face recognition efficacy
(Bindemann et al., 2014; Bobak et al., 2018), other studies report that self-ratings of face
recognition efficacy are moderately to strongly related to objective performance
(Livingston & Shah, 2018; Ventura et al., 2018).
Focusing specifically on eyewitness-identification paradigms, the current research
provides initial evidence for a relation between self-reportedmemorydiscontentment and
accuracy in line-up identification settings. Most notably, we expected the relation
between self-ratings of memory efficacy and identification performance to be weaker in
biased line-ups compared to unbiased line-ups, but this relation was similar for both
conditions. This finding has important implications given that other post-dictors of
eyewitness identification performance are undermined in identifications made on biased
line-ups (Charman et al., 2011; Key et al., 2017). In otherwords, although confidence and
decision time have reduced diagnostic value of accuracy in biased line-ups, the same is not
true for self-ratings of eyewitness memory efficacy. Charman et al. (2011) demonstrate
that biased line-ups reduce the diagnostic value of confidence because confidence is
inflated when the line-up target is compared with implausible fillers. The authors also
propose a scaling effect explanation for this finding, based on the fact that witnesses must
generate anchor points when providing a similarity score between two faces on a
subjective scale (such as a 1 to 7 scale). During an identification, these anchor points may
be affected by external factors, such as the dissimilarity between fillers and the target. In
the case of self-ratings of memory efficacy, it is less likely that broader ratings (i.e., ‘how
good is your memory for faces?’) will be affected by situational factors such as filler
dissimilarity. An individual who often distrusts their ability to recognize unfamiliar faces is
unlikely to change this self-assessment when exposed to a biased or unbiased line-up.
Therefore, specific self-ratings of eyewitness memory efficacymay be useful estimators of
accuracy independently of line-up fairness. If replicated, this finding may have important
applied implications given the practical difficulties in producing unbiased line-ups
without computerized systems (Memon et al., 2011).
Another goal of the current study was to further investigate the relation between self-
ratings of memory efficacy and eyewitness confidence–accuracy relationship. Lower
scores in all eyewitness metamemory factors (i.e., EMS-Contentment, EMS-Discontent-
ment, and EMS-Strategies) were indicative of a stronger confidence–accuracy relation
among choosers, while higher scores in these factors were related to more overconfi-
dence. This finding indicates that individuals who do not hold overly strong positive or
negative opinions about their face recognition ability (low EMS-Contentment and low
EMS-Discontentment) are better calibrated when reporting their confidence, while
individuals with a stronger opinion (i.e., either for low or high memory ability) tend to
exaggerate their confidence assessments. Both individuals with high EMS-Contentment
and high EMS-Discontentment tended to be overconfident in their identifications. In
contrast, Olsson and Juslin (1999) observed that individualswho rated themselves as good
face recognizers had a more diagnostic confidence–accuracy relationship. However, in
that study the authors acknowledge as a limitation having used single items of unknown
validity and reliability, so inferences of memory self-efficacy from such a measure may be
limited. The current data support the notion that individuals highly content with their
own memories tend to exaggerate their confidence (Rickenbach, Agrigoroaei, &
Lachman, 2015). The relation betweenhigher discontentment andhigher overconfidence
seems less straightforward. One possible explanation for this result is that choosers who
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are generally discontent with their own memories may overestimate their confidence
precisely because they have selected someone from a line-up. In other words, if an
individual is discontentwith theirmemory efficacy, but nevertheless select someone from
a line-up, the selection may be followed by inflated confidence. Finally, individuals who
claimed to endorse more memory strategies to encode faces were also more likely to be
overconfident, possibly because those individuals feel that such strategies help them
encode stronger memory traces (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012). It is important to
note, however, that score on the EMS-Strategies factor alone cannot inform whether
participants used any strategies that they claimed to use.
Our prediction that eyewitness-specific metamemory factors would have a stronger
relation to identification performance compared to general metamemory factors was
somewhat supported. We come to this conclusion because EMS-Discontentment was the
strongest predictor in the models testing metamemory factors as predictors of
identification accuracy among choosers. This pattern of results supports the utility of
domain-specific memory self-efficacy, defined as an individual’s appraisal of their usual
efficacy in a given memory domain (Hertzog & Dixon, 1994). Our findings also suggest
that assessments of self-efficacy focused on eyewitness-specific domains (e.g., face and
person identification) are more valuable than assessments of generalmemory efficacy in
distinguishing accurate from inaccurate identifications among choosers.
The current study has a number of limitations. First, although we tested two different
targets in our eyewitness paradigm, we only used one mock-crime video. We reasoned
that the inclusion of multiple target events could generate noise and affect the power of
our analyses, so it remains to be determinedwhether the current findings would replicate
when assessing witness performance for different types of target events. Second, the
metamemory assessment occurredprior to the line-up identification tasks. In planning our
procedure,we reasoned that exposure to the identification tasks before the completion of
the metamemory assessment would have affected self-ratings of memory efficacy to a
greater extent than completing the assessments would affect eyewitness performance
(Olsson& Juslin, 1999). This may have been appropriate for the aims of the current study,
but future investigation should examine the robustness of self-rated memory efficacy as
predictors of eyewitness performance when measures are obtained after the identifica-
tion tasks. Additionally, the fact that the EMS was always completed before the other
general metamemory questionnaires may have influenced responses in the general
metamemory questionnaires. We decided to always present the EMS questionnaire first
because the data used in this studywere also used for testing the development and validity
of this scale, so including other measures before the EMS could have impaired its
development. However, a recent study adopting counterbalancing procedures shows no
evidence of order effects regarding the presentation of eyewitness-specific and general
metamemory measures (Saraiva, van Boeijen, et al., 2019; Saraiva et al., 2019).
Taken together, our findings contribute to the ongoing challenge of distinguishing
accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications in the criminal justice system. We
present initial evidence that choosers who report higher discontentment with their face
and person identification efficacy are more likely to commit a false identification. Further
work is necessary to determine the generalizability of these results to different target
events and for metamemory assessments obtained after the identification tasks.
Furthermore, metamemory assessments can increase the diagnostic value of confidence,
given the observation that individuals with stronger opinions about their face recognition
efficacy tend to be overconfident. This is of importance because confidence statements
are often used to discriminate accurate from inaccurate witnesses, but little is known
Metamemory and eyewitness identification 17
about whether confidence statements are affected by individual differences related to
self-efficacy.
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